Al-Hilu and Post-State Alliances: Contradictory Discourse and Dependence on Regional Powers

Al-Asma’i Bashari

The New Sudan project, following South Sudan’s independence, continues its structural fragmentation from a cohesive national project led by Dr. John Garang to fragmented, hesitant projects divided among elites and leaders such as Malik Agar, Yasser Arman, Khamis Jalab, and others. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, faces a highly complex political and intellectual test. This test pertains not only to its stance on the war or the form of the Sudanese state, but also to the growing contradiction between its theoretical discourse and its political alliances. The movement, which for many years presented itself as a project opposed to the nation-state in its historical form—a continuation of a colonial structure that reproduced hegemony and marginalization after independence—is now entering into alliances with entities and forces directly or indirectly linked to regional and international powers active in the Sudanese crisis.

Herein lies the great paradox: how can a movement that rejects the nation-state because, according to its ideological framework, it is a product of colonial domination, find itself in alliances that raise serious questions about the independence of national decision-making? And how can a project that champions liberation from the center and historical hegemony position itself within a political arena where regional and international agendas clash, agendas that make no secret of their interest in Sudans future, its location, and its resources?

Abdel Aziz al-Hilu is not merely a passing military or political leader. His project is based on a clear vision of the nature of the Sudanese crisis, namely that the state formed after independence failed to overcome the legacy of colonial rule, and that the elites who inherited power reproduced centralism, exclusion, and inequality between Sudans regions. Therefore, he proposed the "New Sudan" project and the re-establishment of the state on different foundations, including equal citizenship, secularism, and the redistribution of power and wealth.

However, the problem does not lie in the right of any political movement to criticize the state or demand its re-establishment. This is a legitimate political and intellectual right, especially in a country that has endured decades of wars, divisions, and exclusion. The problem begins when criticism of the nation-state transforms into a stance that seems to strip it of all value, while simultaneously seeking legitimacy and alliances within regional and international systems that have their own vested interests.

External powers do not enter Sudan out of altruism, nor do they sponsor political alliances for the sake of the Sudanese people. Every country in the region has its own security, economic, and political calculations, and every international power has its own vision of Sudans position on the map of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region, and the countrys resources. It is politically naive to believe that these powers would support any project without seeking to influence its direction.

Therefore, the real danger does not lie merely in engaging with the outside world. Almost all Sudanese political forces have established, to varying degrees, foreign relations. The danger begins when the outside world becomes the guarantor of the alliance, the source of power, or the decisive influence on political decisions. At that point, talk of liberation from hegemony becomes nothing more than a beautiful slogan that clashes with a different reality.

The SPLM-North is now required to answer a fundamental question: Is its project to build a new Sudan, or to dismantle the old Sudan without possessing a practical and agreed-upon vision for what will come after? Because criticism of the nation-state should not lead to the negation of the very idea of the nation. The Sudanese state may be failing at certain historical junctures, and it may be unjust, centralized, and hijacked by an elite, but this does not mean that the alternative is to dismantle the national sphere and open its doors to regional and international powers to redraw it according to their interests.

The current war has provided a harsh lesson for everyone. When the state weakens, conflict does not disappear; rather, its centers multiply. When the national monopoly on politics and arms collapses, new forces, both local and foreign, enter the vacuum. And when Sudanese forces fail to produce a comprehensive national project, Sudan becomes an arena for the conflicts of others.

In this context, the alliance the SPLM-North is involved in becomes more than just a temporary political arrangement. It is a test of the credibility of its project. If the movement truly believes in liberating Sudanese people from the hegemony of the central government, it must be equally opposed to the hegemony of external powers. If it rejects the Khartoum elite imposing the form of the state on the rest of the Sudanese people, it should not accept that other capitals determine Sudans future.

The most dangerous contradiction in Sudanese politics is that many forces speak of national sovereignty while seeking external support, and speak of independence while their alliances are formed according to regional power balances. The SPLM-North is not exempt from this test.

No one has the right to monopolize patriotism or distribute certificates of treason, and accusing opponents of foreign ties cannot replace political debate. But the Sudanese people have the right to ask all forces, including al-Hilus movement: What are the limits of your alliances? Who sets your agenda? What guarantees prevent political support from turning into a form of guardianship? And will the decision remain Sudanese when the balance of power becomes tied to external wills?

Sudan does not need a rehash of the old state, nor new alliances that merely replace one form of hegemony with another. What it needs is a national project that acknowledges the failures of the past without declaring war on the very idea of the nation, that resists centralism without opening the door to foreign tutelage, and that rebuilds the state without reducing Sudan to a mere geographical entity subject to negotiation among regional and international powers.

Herein lies the test for Abdel Aziz al-Hilu and his movement: either the "New Sudan" project will be a genuine project for national liberation, or it will, under the pressure of alliances, war, and the balance of power, become just another chapter in the history of the struggle for Sudan. Slogans alone do not liberate peoples, and alliances do not become national simply because their participants raise the banners of revolution and change. The true measure is the independence of decision-making, the clarity of the project, and the ability of political forces to place Sudan above the interests of regional powers, above the temptations of power, and above the calculations of war.