When Dialogue Becomes a Strategic End in Itself

Ameer Babaker Abdalla
In literature, dialogue has no independent value apart from the plot. Once it becomes detached from the narrative, it turns into didactic discourse and loses its artistic function. Politics—particularly in civil wars—often presents the opposite picture. Dialogue between adversaries may acquire value in its own right, even when it does not immediately produce a final agreement, because it preserves minimum channels of communication and prevents the complete breakdown of the last threads connecting the warring parties. Yet this reality should not evolve into a political illusion in which dialogue itself becomes the objective, while genuine commitment to building peace disappears.

This paradox is particularly evident in Sudan, where regional and international forums have become arenas for repeated discussions about dialogue while the war continues to claim lives and destroy the state. Meetings continue, communiqués multiply, yet the battlefield changes only toward further escalation. This raises a fundamental question: has dialogue itself become a strategic objective, replacing the goal of ending the war?

Political dialogue undoubtedly serves important functions. It provides a permanent channel of communication that prevents complete rupture between belligerents. It acts as a safety valve, absorbing shocks and reducing emotional reactions, while giving the parties an opportunity to reassess their positions away from the pressures of the battlefield. Dialogue also helps manage contradictions rather than allowing them to explode, enabling each side to understand the others red lines and fostering practical recognition that every party will inevitably form part of any future settlement, however deep their disagreements may remain.

These positive functions, however, lose their significance when dialogue becomes an end in itself or merely a mechanism for managing a crisis instead of resolving it. In many conflicts, negotiations are used to reorganize military positions, gain time, or improve bargaining leverage while combat operations continue with even greater intensity. Under such circumstances, the continuation of dialogue without genuine political progress becomes part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

The greatest danger facing Sudan today is not simply the continuation of the war, but the transformation of dialogue into a substitute for peace, and of international forums into instruments for managing rather than ending the conflict. Dialogue derives its value not from the fact that it takes place, but from its ability to generate a political process capable of ending the war and rebuilding the state.

Sudans crisis illustrates this dilemma clearly as the conflict has entered a stage of strategic stalemate. Both military actors now view the war as an existential struggle that leaves little room for compromise. The Sudanese Armed Forces insist that dismantling the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), withdrawing them from urban areas, and requiring them to surrender their weapons are preconditions for any negotiations. In the armys view, granting the RSF any form of political or military legitimacy poses a direct threat to the Sudanese state and its institutions.

The RSF, on the other hand, remains committed to a fundamentally different vision centered on refounding the Sudanese state and establishing a new military institution based on a new doctrine, with the RSF serving as its core. It rejects any return to the pre-war status quo that existed before 15 April 2023. From this perspective, negotiations are viewed as a means of consolidating new realities on the ground rather than reversing them.

The crisis is further complicated because both sides continue to believe that military victory remains achievable. The Sudanese army places its confidence in military mobilization, air superiority, and external support, believing these factors can eventually restore full control over the country. The RSF, meanwhile, relies on a strategy of attrition, territorial expansion, and prolonging the conflict. As long as both parties remain convinced that victory is attainable, the painful political concessions that usually pave the way for peace remain unlikely.

The proliferation of regional and international initiatives has also prolonged the crisis rather than bringing it closer to resolution. The Jeddah process, the African Union, IGAD, and conferences in Paris, Berlin, and elsewhere have created multiple parallel tracks without succeeding in coordinating efforts or imposing a unified political vision. The competing initiatives have instead allowed the warring parties to move from one forum to another, using diplomatic platforms to maneuver and buy time while external military and financial support continues to fuel the conflict.

Sudans civilian political forces have fared little better. They were expected to emerge as an independent pressure bloc capable of pushing the military parties toward compromise. Instead, they became trapped in organizational and political fragmentation. Alliances formed after the outbreak of war quickly splintered, giving rise to new political groupings with competing visions of how to engage the armed actors. Disagreements eventually extended beyond relations with the military to encompass the very nature of the Sudanese state and the framework of any future transitional period.

Civilian actors also became ensnared in military polarization. Some regarded the Sudanese Armed Forces as the national institution that must be supported to preserve state unity, while others were accused of displaying excessive flexibility toward the RSF. These divisions significantly eroded public confidence in the civilian movements independence and its ability to represent the aspirations of ordinary Sudanese outside the competing agendas of the warring parties.

The absence of a unified political vision has further weakened civilian influence. While some groups call for an immediate ceasefire followed by urgent political negotiations, others argue that the crisis extends far beyond ending hostilities and requires a comprehensive refoundation of the Sudanese state together with meaningful solutions to decades of historical marginalization. These competing perspectives have ensured that every initiative for civilian dialogue becomes entangled in conditions, delays, and mutual withdrawals.

Perhaps the most consequential factor has been the relocation of much of Sudans civilian political activity abroad as a result of mass displacement and deteriorating security conditions. This has sharply reduced the ability of civilian actors to mobilize meaningful public pressure inside Sudan. Conferences and statements issued from foreign capitals increasingly appear disconnected from the daily reality of Sudanese citizens struggling with hunger, displacement, and constant insecurity.

Meanwhile, the international community has failed to move beyond crisis management toward conflict resolution. Its reluctance to exert decisive pressure to secure a ceasefire or guarantee humanitarian access has allowed Sudan to become the worlds largest humanitarian and protection crisis. Diplomatic paralysis has translated into escalating human suffering on a daily basis.

Famine is spreading across multiple regions, while millions of Sudanese face acute levels of food insecurity. Food and humanitarian assistance have, at times, become instruments of war. At the same time, continued fighting has displaced more than one-third of Sudans population, most of whom now endure extremely harsh conditions either within Sudan or in neighboring countries already struggling under severe economic and humanitarian pressures.

The health system has suffered near-total collapse across much of the conflict zone. Most hospitals have ceased functioning, while outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and dengue fever have spread following the breakdown of water and sanitation systems. At the same time, humanitarian response plans face severe funding shortfalls that have forced international organizations to reduce both food assistance and medical services.

These developments have unfolded alongside continuing grave violations against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, child recruitment, widespread looting, and attacks on volunteers and members of Sudans Emergency Response Rooms, who have become the final lifeline for countless local communities.

What Sudan needs is not more conferences or more statements, but a comprehensive political process beginning with a preparatory conference that brings together all parties—or their representatives—to establish clear principles for a ceasefire, civilian protection, and guaranteed humanitarian access. That process should then evolve into an inclusive national dialogue capable of addressing the structural roots of Sudans crisis rather than merely its symptoms.

If the international community continues to limit itself to managing the conflict, and Sudans political and military actors continue to use dialogue primarily as a tactical instrument, Sudan will remain trapped in the same vicious cycle—one in which dialogue becomes a strategic objective while peace itself is indefinitely postponed.