German Foundation: No Viable Political Process in Sudan without International Diplomacy
Moatinoon
Militär Aktuell, an Austrian magazine specializing in military, security, and defense news and issues, interviewed Lukas Kopfernagel, director of the Konrad Adelanor Foundations Addis Ababa office, about the war in Sudan.
Lukas Kopfernagel, director of the Konrad Adelanor Foundations Addis Ababa office, said the likelihood of a military stalemate in Sudan is increasing, given the countrys vast geographic area and the fact that each side has its own supply networks and supporters. He warned of the risk of long-term fragmentation and the erosion of state cohesion over the years.
He stated that resolving this stalemate can only be overcome through external mediation and highlighted the important role of the United Arab Emirates as an influential player with direct access to the Rapid Support Forces and close ties with Western countries. He called on Abu Dhabi to reconsider and act responsibly for the sake of regional stability.
"There will be no viable political process without clearly coordinated international diplomacy, supported by trusted mediators with real influence," he added.
Mr. Kupfernagel, in the Sudanese war, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been battling for power in the State. What strategic interests are being pursued by the rival Generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo beyond the question of power?
Beyond the immediate question of power, the two generals are concerned with very different strategic objectives and world views, which have a profound impact on Sudan. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander-in-chief of the SAF, sees himself as the guardian of state order and wants to preserve the traditional military hierarchy as the foundation of a centralized, territorially cohesive Sudan. He is seeking support from traditional elites, traditional partners and international players who are interested in a functioning state with clear institutions – albeit under military control.
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – known as “Hemedti” – on the other hand, pursues a decidedly personalistic power strategy based on economic control, monopolization of violence and the targeted instrumentalization of marginalized groups. His RSF is not just a military opponent, but a widely ramified network that exerts great influence via informal economic structures – such as the lucrative gold smuggling business. Hemedti likes to present himself as an advocate of the periphery against the central elite in Khartoum, but his rise is based less on inclusive state reform than on an economy of violence, mercenarism and brutal repression, particularly in Darfur. He exemplifies a form of “warlord politics” that focuses on short-term gains and lasting destabilization – at considerable humanitarian cost.
Both warring parties are financing the war with gold. Can you briefly outline who the most important foreign buyers are and which routes are used to transport the gold abroad?
In fact, the illegal gold trade plays a central role in financing both warring parties – with the RSF under Hemedti in particular controlling an extensive and well-organized gold export network. A large proportion of Sudanese gold is smuggled to Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic via smuggling routes. From there, it is fed into international markets via Dubai – by far the most important trading center. The United Arab Emirates is considered the most important buyer of Sudanese gold, not least because the precious metal trade there has long been barely controlled. According to UN reports, over 90% of Sudanese gold was exported illegally in 2022 alone – largely through networks attributed to the RSF.
SAF, on the other hand, controls smaller, mostly state-run mines in the east of the country. It also uses gold as a source of foreign currency – partly via Egypt, partly via non-transparent deals with Russian or Chinese middlemen. This creates a shadow war that is largely kept going by the export of one of the country’s most valuable resources – under the eyes of international markets, but often beyond regulatory control.
To what extent are external actors such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates or Russia contributing to the escalation or containment of the conflict?
External actors play an ambivalent role – they act partly as fire accelerators, partly as potential fire extinguishers, but often with contradictory interests. Egypt clearly supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General al-Burhan, not least out of strategic concern for stability along the shared border and control over the Nile. Cairo sees an RSF-dominated Sudan as a security risk, particularly due to Hemedti’s proximity to the Emirates and his unpredictability.
The United Arab Emirates is considered the most important external supporter of the RSF – both financially and logistically. In Hemedti, they have found a partner that gives them access to Sudanese gold, mercenary networks and geopolitical influence in the region. Arms supplies to the RSF were presumably organized via neighbouring countries such as Chad and Libya. Russia, in turn, maintained close ties to Hemedti’s network, particularly through structures close to Wagner, for example in the context of gold trading and security cooperation. These actors contribute to the escalation by providing resources and political backing – while their rhetoric often speaks of stability. As a result, diplomatic efforts to de-escalate are not only half-hearted, but structurally undermined.
Over 30 million people – more than half of the Sudanese population – are dependent on aid and almost 13 million have been displaced. By November 2024, more than 150,000 civilians are said to have died. There is talk of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Can you confirm this and who is responsible?
The humanitarian situation in Sudan is catastrophic – it is one of the largest displacement crises in the world. With over 13 million internally displaced persons and a total of more than 30 million people in acute need, almost the entire society is affected by hunger, violence and a lack of prospects. The reports from the Darfur region are particularly alarming, where targeted attacks on civilians have been carried out since mid-2023 – often along ethnic lines. International organizations, including the United Nations and humanitarian observers, speak of possible war crimes, ethnic cleansing and in some cases even of signs of genocide – particularly against members of the Masalit minority in West Darfur.
Responsibility for this lies with several actors, but numerous reports point to the systematic involvement of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias. These often operate with a high intensity of violence and appear to be deliberately destroying civilian structures and displacing population groups in certain areas. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the conflict as a whole is characterized by a far-reaching erosion of humanitarian norms. The SAF is also criticized for attacks on civilian facilities and blocking humanitarian aid. What is lacking is an effective international protection strategy for the civilian population – and consistent documentation of the crimes to enable subsequent investigation and prosecution.
What political scenarios appear realistic in the event of a military stalemate or international mediation?
A military stalemate is increasingly likely – given the country’s enormous geographical size and the fact that both sides have their own supply networks and supporters. In such a case, there is a risk of long-term fragmentation: the SAF would concentrate on the urban centers in the north and east, while the RSF would control large parts of Darfur and the west. This not only entails the risk of parallel power structures, but also the erosion of state coherence over the years.
Politically, such a stalemate could only be resolved through external mediation – but neither the African Union nor IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) currently appear to have the necessary political clout or the trust of both parties to the conflict. This makes the role of the United Arab Emirates all the more important: as an influential player with direct access to the RSF and close relations with Western countries, the UAE potentially has the leverage to work towards a political solution. However, this would require a rethink in Abu Dhabi – away from geopolitical calculations and towards genuine responsibility for regional stability. Ultimately, there will be no viable political process without clearly coordinated international diplomacy, supported by credible mediators with real influence.
Source: militaeraktuell.at
