Sudan Without a Center: Fragmented Authority and State Disintegration Amid War and Absence of Sovereignty
Sudanese Media Forum
By Amjad Sharaf Al-Din Al-Makki
Editor-in-Chief and Head of Research and Translation – Sudanile
Introduction
At a pivotal moment in Sudan’s contemporary history, the political “center” of the state has receded behind a bloody scene torn apart by warring factions and conflicting authorities. Sovereign institutions are reeling under the weight of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, while the state, as a unifying entity, fades from view. This accelerated fragmentation of central authority reflects not merely a temporary collapse in governance, but signals a structural transformation affecting the very nature of the state. Sudan, amid its current conflicts, appears to have entered a phase of "forced de-centralization," where power is fragmented among military forces, armed movements, tribal leaders, and local civil administrations—each asserting de facto legitimacy fueled by geography, weaponry, and political vacuum.
This reality surpasses the realm of transient security or political crises and raises an existential question: Are we witnessing a slide into "Somalization"—a model of fragmented statehood where local authorities and warlords dominate in the absence of central rule? Or does Sudan, despite its apparent disintegration, still retain opportunities to reconstruct a unified sovereign center, perhaps through new models of decentralized or consensus-based governance?
This analytical study seeks to trace the dynamics of multiple authorities in Sudan in the context of central state disintegration and the erosion of its monopoly over violence and decision-making. It sheds light on emerging alternative governance models in the state’s absence and explores the structural implications for national unity, state functions, and the very meaning of sovereignty.
From the Capital (the Center) to the Peripheries (the Margins): How Power Became Fragmented in Sudan
Since the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," the capital Khartoum has witnessed an unprecedented collapse of its administrative, military, and civil infrastructure. It quickly became a battlefield for direct combat and then turned into a deserted city ruled by the power of arms, not by the authority of the state. As the center crumbled, new centers of local power emerged across Sudan to fill the political and security vacuum, establishing their own forms of authority backed by armed strength and tribal, revolutionary, or regional legitimacy.
In western Sudan, the RSF controls large swathes of the Darfur region, establishing quasi-independent governance models. These include imposing taxes in the form of coercive "protection" fees characterized by oppression, harassment, and bullying, and managing border crossings. The RSF has even appointed civilian officials in some areas, resembling in many ways the alternative governance models that emerged in Somalia following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime or in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi.
In the east, the SAF leadership has entrenched itself in the city of Port Sudan, managing the remnants of the national ministries and quasi-central institutions—an arrangement that reflects a form of “exiled authority” governing in the name of the state without actual control over it or the capital.
Alongside the two main military factions, actual authority in Sudan is also distributed among other actors. Armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement retain significant—albeit partial—influence in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. These groups possess field forces and political leadership, some of whom occupy senior and sovereign positions in the Port Sudan-based government, while others adopt independent or fluctuating stances. In addition, certain regions—particularly in the north and west of the country—have witnessed a notable resurgence of traditional local administrations and tribal leaders, who have assumed responsibility for security, public services, and dispute resolution through customary means, in the complete absence of formal state institutions.
According to analyses published by the American journal Foreign Policy, the current Sudanese landscape represents a “gradual dismantling of central authority,” leading to the reconfiguration of power along local, tribal, and security-based lines. This evokes comparisons with failed decentralized state models where local units overshadow national unity.
State Disintegration and Erosion of Sovereignty: Has Sudan Entered a Phase of State Collapse or Somalization?
The decline of central authority in Sudan is not merely an administrative dysfunction or a temporary disruption. Rather, it reflects a deep deviation in the function of the state itself—as a sovereign entity that monopolizes violence, regulates the political sphere, and ensures territorial and demographic cohesion. What we are witnessing today is a gradual transition toward a model of a fragmented state, in which official institutions are replaced by multiple centers of power, many of which replicate authority based on tribal or regional loyalty, or through the logic of armed force.
It might be tempting to use the term “Somalization” to describe this pattern of collapse. However, while the comparison has analytical merit, it may not fully capture the complexity of the Sudanese case. Somalia experienced a sudden collapse of its centralized regime, while Sudan appears to be sliding into disintegration through a slow trajectory fed by deep-seated structural divisions, local conflicts, the multiplicity of actors, and entangled regional and international interventions.
According to a report by the International Crisis Group, Sudan now faces “one of the gravest cases of declining sovereignty in contemporary Africa,” where central state authority is eroding not through total collapse, but through the redistribution of sovereign functions to non-state actors. These actors carry out sovereign-like roles—levying taxes, managing services, regulating borders, and at times coordinating directly with international parties through regional intermediaries.
The most alarming aspect of this transformation is not simply the political or military fragmentation, but the redefinition of the state itself—from a sovereign monopolizer of power to a fragmented space controlled by local forces that behave as miniature states within the larger state.
Regional and International Influence: How External Actors Contributed to Internal Fragmentation
Sudan’s state disintegration is not solely the result of internal dynamics. Regional and international interventions have played a critical role in accelerating the collapse and reinforcing war as a substitute for statehood. Since the outbreak of the recent conflict, the interests of external actors have intersected with those of local factions, transforming Sudan’s geography into an open theater for proxy rivalries, strategic competition, and covert interventions.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ranks foremost among regional actors linked to financial and logistical support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in line with its regional strategy of backing local proxies to expand its influence in strategic areas like the Red Sea and its African hinterland. Conversely, Egypt has sought to maintain the Sudanese army as a traditional strategic ally, motivated by concerns over water security related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its broader security apprehensions about the potential spread of irregular forces along its southern border.
Russia’s involvement is evident through its semi-overt relationship with the Wagner Group, which has been active in Sudan for years under the guise of gold trading and security assistance. This has entrenched a form of grey-zone partnership with unofficial actors. Reports by BBC, Reuters, and academic publications from Chatham House and the Carnegie Middle East Center have documented the growing scope of Russian influence—especially in Darfur—through gold smuggling networks and the financing of local conflicts.
In contrast to these competing blocs, international organizations and UN institutions have appeared unable to formulate an effective political or humanitarian approach. Initiatives like the "Jeddah Talks" have failed to establish any lasting ceasefire, while the UN’s role has been reduced to issuing warning statements, lacking any real tools for intervention or deterrence amid divisions within the Security Council and the declining priority of Sudan on the agendas of major powers.
These developments show that the disintegration of the state in Sudan cannot be understood in isolation from the regional and international context. External actors have not merely been bystanders; to varying degrees, they have been partners in producing fragility, deepening fragmentation, and framing authority outside the bounds of the central state.
The Future of the State in Sudan: Is There a Horizon for Reconstruction?
Amid a multi-layered collapse, the central question persists with urgency: Can the Sudanese state be revived as a unified entity? Or has the country entered an irreversible phase of political and regional fragmentation, where power is re-engineered through local centers governed by networks of interest and logic of control rather than legitimacy?
In theory, the history of the Sudanese state—despite its complexities—offers room for recovery and reconstruction, especially under what is known as “post-conflict state formation”, where fragmented states witness a gradual return to centralized governance through negotiated or regionally supported arrangements that reshape the state in new forms. However, this possibility is conditional upon several factors:
A comprehensive and lasting end to the war, a condition that remains elusive given the absence of political will among the warring parties and the transformation of the war economy into a source of power and influence.
A unifying national will that transcends the logic of dominance and military victory, and is founded on the principle of redefining the state—not as a prize or a tool for hegemony—but as a social contract that ensures fair participation in power and wealth.
Serious regional and international guarantees, which go beyond humanitarian aid and relief support to actively engage in crafting a political solution based on legitimacy, accountability, and institutional rebuilding—away from alignment dynamics that have only deepened the crisis.
According to a paper issued by The United States Institute of Peace, Sudan needs a "comprehensive political process that redefines the relationship between the center and the periphery, establishes new foundations for local governance, without cementing secession or dismantling the unity of the state."
However, the biggest challenge in Sudan remains the absence of a unifying national actor. The political scene after the revolution, then the coup, then the war, has produced fragmented and competing forces, vying for legitimacy while lacking an integrated strategic vision for the future state.
The future of the state in Sudan will not be determined solely by the military balance of power, but also by the ability of Sudanese people, across all their diverse components, to move beyond the logic of "power as privilege" to that of "the state as a shared project." This transformation, though seemingly distant, remains a necessary condition for Sudan to survive as a state—not just as a geographical entity.
Meanwhile, in a dramatic development reshaping the conflict in Sudan, the city of Port Sudan—the temporary administrative capital and seat of the internationally recognized government—has witnessed drone strikes targeting vital facilities and sovereign sites. These attacks, unprecedented in scale in the country’s east, marked a qualitative shift in the course of the battle, demonstrating the expanding scope of targeting and the advancing capabilities of the opposing side. This has undermined assumptions of Port Sudan as a "safe haven" and further weakened the central authority’s fragility there.
Yet, more striking than the attack itself was the silence of influential regional and international powers—or what appeared to be a coordinated "non-response." Some analysts—as noted in published analyses by Middle East Eye and Al Jazeera Centre for Studies—argued that this silence reflects neither negligence nor neutrality, but rather an unstated strategy to pressure Sudan’s military establishment. The aim is to push it toward negotiations after its insistence on a military resolution and rejection of any comprehensive political solutions. Despite being the official seat of the government, Port Sudan has not received any political protection or overt support from its regional allies—a tacit message: either compromise or face further strategic exposure.
However, this equation—built on regional power balances and interests—overlooks the heavy price paid by Sudanese civilians. While drones maneuver in the skies to shift power dynamics, the tragedies of displaced persons, refugees, and the homeless escalate on the ground. Forced from their homes, they cross borders or seek shelter in areas lacking the most basic living conditions. They are the weakest link in the chain of conflict—voiceless in conferences, absent from negotiation rooms—yet they bear the full cost.
Epilogue
Between the Question of the State and the Question of Survival
What Sudan is witnessing today cannot be reduced to a war between two armed factions, nor even to a mere power struggle. Rather, it is a deep structural crisis that strikes at the very idea of the state: How is it built? For whom is it built? And who has the right to represent it, shape its identity, and safeguard its internal and external borders? The absence of a central authority, the proliferation of competing powers, the erosion of sovereignty, and the entanglement of local, regional, and international actors are not fleeting symptoms—they are signs of a profound transformation in Sudan’s political structure, one that threatens the very existence of the state as a governing framework for society.
In this context, traditional solutions are insufficient, and superficial settlements are futile unless accompanied by a national vision that redefines the state—not as a center that dominates the peripheries, but as a shared space that embraces diversity rather than suppresses it. Sudan needs more than a ceasefire; it needs a reconciliation with itself, with its history, with its marginalized regions, and with its citizens, for whom the state has become either a weapon turned against them or a distant shadow offering neither shelter nor protection.
If drones have now reached Port Sudan, it is not merely a sign that the flames of war have spread to what remains of the center—it also forces us to confront the most critical question: Will the state in Sudan survive as a unified entity? Or will it be redefined as a contested geography under the rule of multiple authorities that govern without representing, and control without uniting?
The answer to this question will determine Sudan’s future—not just as a republic, but as an idea capable of endurance, or as an entity redrawn from the outside in the name of its people, yet in the absence of their true voice: the homeland and its citizens.
Report by: Amjad Sharafeldin Al-Makki
Editorial Secretary & Head of Research and Translation – Sudanile
Researcher and PhD Candidate in International Relations
Salve Regina University
amgadss@gmail.com
