Will the use of drones impose a mandatory air and sea blockade on Sudan?
Report - Moatinoon
Beginning on May 4, 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a series of drone strikes targeting vital infrastructure in Port Sudan, including Osman Digna Air Base, fuel depots, the citys main container terminal, and the international airport. This put air and sea traffic to a real test, appearing to be an attempt to impose a mandatory air and sea blockade to exhaust the government in Port Sudan.
Port Sudan, previously considered a safe haven and the de facto administrative capital after the RSF took control of Khartoum in April 2023, had been largely spared direct conflict.
However, the recent attacks have destabilized this relative stability, threatening the delivery of essential aid to millions of internally displaced persons, and exacerbating the countrys humanitarian crisis.
These attacks led to widespread fires, power outages, and the suspension of humanitarian aid flights, severely impacting the citys role as a vital logistics and relief center.
Several Objectives
Crisis management expert Major General Dr. Amin Ismail Majzoub, speaking to Moatinoon, attributed the recent developments in the use of drone warfare in the Sudanese war, and the targeting of Port Sudan in particular, to several objectives.
He said the first is to pressure the Sudanese government to enter into direct negotiations to manage the crisis. This is a demand of the Rapid Support Forces militia, which is currently suffering greatly. The second objective is to compensate for the shortage of ground forces within the Rapid Support Forces and thus transition the battle to an air battle. The use of drones does not control any area; on the contrary, it destroys but does not control. Majzoub said the third objective is to weaken the Sudanese economy by destroying reserve fuel and gas depots and closing the sea and air ports. The fourth goal is for the militia to lead the world in imposing some kind of embargo on Sudan, whether through an air or naval embargo or threatening navigation in the Red Sea. This would give it a place in any regional or international interactions, something the Rapid Support Forces leadership currently lacks. It lacks leadership or influence in regional or international organizations.
Majzoub told Moatinoon that these goals have not yet achieved any success. He said that the Sudanese government is still standing on its feet, and the Sudanese economy is still functioning, albeit at a lower rate than before the war. Relations with the regional and international community remain strong, and there is full recognition of the Sudanese government and stability in the relationship between the government and the people. He added that these are merely attempts by the Rapid Support Forces and its supporters to control public opinion, create a structural imbalance between the Sudanese government and people, and alter the relationship with regional and international organizations.
For his part, military expert Rashid Babiker agreed with the crisis management expert, stating that the recent military developments represent attempts to exert military pressure to shift to political action through direct negotiations or through intermediaries. This is done to preserve what remains of the military and political structure as a foothold in the next regime, while a new strategy is considered to achieve this goal, the most important factor of which is the presence of a domestic, military, and civilian ally whenever possible.
He added to "Moatinoon" that "all the carefully crafted plans, with all the necessary capabilities and more, have failed, but the project and its insistence remain because it represents the basis for the survival of certain countries in the coming world." He called on the Sudanese state to destroy the domestic ally and contain the regional and international enemy, or to reach a strategy with it that ensures the survival of all, even if in a new variant. However, our goal remains survival and existence, no matter the cost.
Vital and strategic sites targeted by drones:
Port Sudan South Port, all the main fuel depots in the port, the transit area/Nile Petroleum Depots, Port Sudan International Airport, Bashayer Port Power Station, and the transformer station in Port Sudan. Only the Turkish barge remains in the electricity sector. Flamingo Naval Base/Warehouses and Residences. Aviation College. Marina Hotel. Government Guest House.
The Message is Negotiation
Journalist Adel El-Baz says that the entity imposing the no-fly zone is the international community and the Security Council, and that the Rapid Support Forces do not have the capacity to enforce any such zone. Speaking to Moatinoon, he said that what is happening is not an attempt to impose an air-sea no-fly zone, but rather to force the Sudanese government to surrender and return to the negotiating table and submit to the conditions imposed by it and its allies.
He added that all of this is an attempt to pressure the government and pressure it to reach understandings at the negotiating table.
He pointed out that the marches will not impose new military facts on the ground or impose victories, "otherwise Russia would have defeated Ukraine."
He added that what is happening is an attempt to impose new rules of the game. He said that there are currently 13 movements heading to Darfur, and that the Rapid Support Forces do not have the capacity to withstand this advance. Therefore, they are seeking to send a message to the international community that the war threatens an important waterway and that negotiations are necessary to end it.
Geography is not enough for control.
Political analyst and journalist Mohamed Abdel Aziz tells Moatinoon that the most important thing revealed by this new phase of the qualitative shift in warfare methods in Sudan is that geographical control alone is no longer sufficient to ensure superiority.
He added, "If previous concepts held that deployment does not mean control, the new reality imposes a more complex equation: deployment and control do not necessarily mean victory."
Drone attacks in this context represent a direct threat to supply lines and supposedly safe headquarters, and they also expose the fragility of the classic concept of geographical fortification. The battle has thus gone beyond camouflage and historical comparisons, such as major landing operations, to become more transparent in its target bank and more complex in its ground calculations.
Abdelaziz denied the existence of clear indications that the Rapid Support Forces are seeking to impose an air or sea embargo on Sudan through the use of drones or targeting sea and air ports, such as Port Sudan.
However, he added, "It is clear that targeting the armys fuel stores and air bases may be aimed at hindering its movements and air superiority, while the Rapid Support Forces may be planning extensive military operations to extend its control in Darfur and perhaps even in Kordofan and other regions."
Proxy War
Abdelaziz says that foreign interventions have become more exposed at the regional level, which increases The Cost of the Proxy War. Speaking to Moatinoon, he said that the May 4 attacks may have had political objectives that go beyond mere military tactics. He said that the underlying political messages ranged from shuffling the Red Sea agenda to dragging influential regional powers into the conflict (such as Moscow, Tehran, the Houthis, and Hamas), making the repercussions of the war extend beyond Sudan to include the strategic capitals of the Aviv bloc, Cairo, and Riyadh.
Soft Embargo
For his part, Horn of Africa expert Khaled Mohamed Taha said that the recent drone strikes targeting vital facilities in Port Sudan indicate a qualitative escalation in the tactics of the Rapid Support Forces. He added, "Despite the limited conventional air capabilities of these forces, their increasing reliance on drones is having a direct impact on the security of airspace and maritime space, opening the door to a scenario resembling an undeclared soft embargo implemented through unconventional means."
Khalid pointed out that these attacks create increased risks to civil and military aviation, which could prompt airlines to suspend flights or adjust their routes, effectively diminishing Sudans sovereignty over its airspace. "As for maritime navigation, threatening Port Sudan, the countrys main commercial artery, increases insurance and shipping costs and may prompt some shipping lines to reduce their services or temporarily withdraw, exacerbating the countrys economic isolation and further complicating the humanitarian crisis."
International and Regional Condemnations
The recent drone attacks on Port Sudan have drawn widespread condemnation at the international and regional levels. Several Arab and African countries have condemned these military developments and called on all parties to return to the negotiating table and resolve the crisis in Sudan.
For his part, the UN Secretary-General expressed his deep concern that the recent drone attacks on Port Sudan, the main entry point for humanitarian aid, threaten to increase humanitarian needs and complicate relief operations in Sudan.
The European Union strongly condemned the Rapid Support Forces use of drone strikes against civilian and key targets. In a statement, the EU spokesperson said that these actions are supported by international actors, threatening the safety and well-being of Sudanese civilians and international staff residing in Port Sudan, undermining regional stability, and violating international humanitarian law.
The United States condemned the recent attacks on critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Port Sudan and across the country. The US State Departments Bureau of African Affairs said in a statement that these attacks represent a dangerous escalation of the conflict in Sudan.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) condemned the attacks on civilian facilities and infrastructure in Port Sudan, stressing the citys importance as a lifeline for millions of Sudanese.
