The Nairobi Alliance and Issues of War and Peace in Sudan
Mohamed Badawi
The Nairobi Alliance document was signed by 21 entities and group representatives, as announced on the main platform. These included nine armed movements and eleven entities comprising political parties and representatives.
First Observation:
The list lacked any female representation, raising concerns about participation and gender equality in the anticipated government. This comes despite the momentum surrounding the Nairobi conference, where chants and slogans advocating an end to marginalization were echoed, with notable support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) surpassing other factions. However, the concept of marginalization seems to have been narrowly defined, excluding aspects related to gender, ethnic groups, and minorities. Additionally, there was no representation of non-Muslim religious communities, except for Commander Joseph Tuka, whose presence represented the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) rather than any Christian denomination. This absence may have been intentional, despite the fact that political conflicts in Sudan have ideologically impacted religious freedoms, aiming to restrict their space.
Regarding the Signatories:
From the historical platforms of traditional parties, representatives of different factions of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Unified DUP, namely Ibrahim Al-Mirghani and Mohamed Asmat, held greater prominence compared to the Umma Party, which was represented by retired General Fadl Burmah Nasir. His legitimacy to represent the Umma Party was contested by the party’s deputy leader, Dr. Maryam Al-Sadiq. The presence of representatives from the same parties at the Nairobi meeting but aligned with opposing alliances, namely the Summud and Qimmah alliances, may lead to mutual non-recognition between the two blocs. This situation shifts the conflict from merely stopping the war to disputing the legitimacy of representation.
Signatories of the 2020 Sudan Peace Agreement:
Some leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement signed the Nairobi Alliance document, including Dr. Al-Hadi Idris from the Transitional Council, Al-Tahir Hajar from the Liberation Forces, and Hafez Abdel-Nabi from the Sudanese Alliance. However, the leaders of the Sudanese Alliance were divided, with some joining the Qimmah alliance and others siding with the army, such as Bahar Karama, who was appointed governor of West Darfur.
Notable Absences:
The Sudanese left was conspicuously absent from the Nairobi meeting. This includes the Sudanese Communist Party, which had previously expressed its stance on the Nairobi meeting, as well as the Taqaddum party, which had called for halting the war, and both factions of the Ba’athists and the Nasserists. Their absence raises critical questions regarding peaceful and military options for addressing Sudan’s war and peace issues.
The Native Administration and Its Representation in the Nairobi Alliance
The Native Administration was represented by Sultan Ahmed Dinar of the Fur tribe, whose appearance comes at a time when the war has destroyed the museum of Sultan Ali Dinar in El Fasher. Politically, including Sultan Dinar among the signatories seemed like an attempt to compensate for the absence of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, who has so far refrained from commenting. The absence of al-Nur, along with the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi and the reported resignations of SPLM-N (Al-Hilu faction) supporters in West Darfur, as well as the attempt to represent the Masalit tribe through the King of Masalit in Gereida rather than Sultan Saad Bahr al-Din, highlights that the three largest communities of victims, displaced persons, and refugees in Darfur are not represented in the Nairobi document. Understandably, the stance of these groups is deeply tied to justice as a core issue, stemming from the lack of accountability since the outbreak of the Darfur crisis in 2003. Meanwhile, equating the Native Administration with tribal identity poses a significant risk, similar to relying on tribal analysis in politics, which inevitably leads to flawed conclusions.
Regional Representation in the Alliance:
The list of signatories included Eastern Sudan, represented by the Beja Congress (Opposition) and the Free Lions, with additional influence from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) aligned with Sayyid al-Hasan. In South Kordofan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-N) and the Sudan National Party were represented. Excluding independent figures like Dr. Alaa Naqd, a representative of professionals and technicians, as well as the Federal Democratic Alliance, the majority of signatories were factions that had historically split from the Sudan Liberation Movement. Among them were four groups that had signed the 2020 Sudan Peace Agreement. A notable addition was the Qimmah alliance, which appears as either a counterweight to the Summud alliance or a result of the split within the Taqaddum alliance.
Formation of a Unified Armed Force:
According to the document, the parties involved aim to form a unified military force comprising the armed groups under the agreement. This raises questions regarding the stance of civil society representatives, independent groups, and individuals toward this development. While such an initiative may be objectively understandable in a peacetime context, within the current war, it could lead to further escalation.
Historical Context and Shifts in Positions:
Despite the SPLM-N (Al-Hilu faction) lending credibility to the Nairobi Agreement, the situation recalls the previous Revolutionary Front alliance. In addition to the SPLM-N, signatories included the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Sandal and Commander Abu al-Qasim Imam, who had previously been aligned with the SLM under Abdel Wahid al-Nur but participated in Nairobi as part of the Sudan Liberation Movement–Second Revolution. All these factions were part of the Revolutionary Front, which disbanded shortly after the Abu Karshola attack in 2014.
Impact of the Ongoing Conflict in El Fasher:
As the conference took place, RSF attacks on El Fasher continued. Both Dr. Al-Hadi Idris and Al-Tahir Hajar had previously declared neutrality regarding the factions that aligned with the army, forming the joint force responsible for defending El Fasher against RSF control. Their involvement in evacuating civilians and protecting limited relief convoys to reach Zamzam Camp in North Darfur marked a shift in their stance. By signing the Nairobi document, Idris and Hajar have effectively adopted a new position regarding the situation in El Fasher—an issue that presents the alliance’s first test under the banner of a “peace government,” as the ongoing attacks predominantly endanger civilians.
Military Escalations and Their Influence on the Alliance:
Before the Nairobi document was signed, the Sudanese army continued aerial bombardments in Darfur and South Kordofan. This escalation could undermine the internal cohesion of some signatory groups, particularly the SPLM-N, as the ongoing airstrikes bolster their legitimacy and diminish internal criticism.
Challenges of Alliance Governance:
With the signing of the document, the first phase of the process concludes, ushering in the second phase—the governance and management of the alliance. Historically, this has been the greatest challenge facing both political and military coalitions in Sudan. Key issues include the question of legitimacy among various factions that have effectively split from political parties or armed movements, as well as the stance of international and regional actors toward the alliance.
Prospects of Prolonged Conflict:
Given the fragmentation of Taqaddum, the emergence of the new alliance, and the army’s continuation of military operations, including airstrikes, alongside the RSF’s sustained attacks on El Fasher, the indicators point toward a protracted conflict. This war may extend to other regions, accompanied by the proliferation of military training camps both within and beyond Sudan’s borders, along with increased armament in both quantity and sophistication—an escalation driven by external actors supporting the war.
