``Where Did the Army Come From?``
by Amir Babiker Abdallah
I published this article before the outbreak of war, specifically in early March 2023. In the past couple of days, I saw a video of a group of bearded men addressing members of the armed forces. It seemed to be a form of support for the army but contained inaccuracies, attempting to cloak them in religious legitimacy to make them appear more sacred and absolute. One such claim was that the Umayyad and Abbasid states were military states, ignoring the fact from the Prophets biography that these states were founded on a religious mission and that politics took precedence over the military—not due to a lack of military capability but because it was the natural order of things.
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The question "Where did the army come from?" is not an indignant inquiry like the late writer Tayeb Salihs famous line about the Islamists, "Where did these people come from?" Rather, its a question that might, in trying to uncover its answer, help dismantle the rigid mindset some military personnel and their supporters are trying to enshrine, which isolates the army from its environment and disconnects it from its roots. It’s also to prevent the army from turning into the Frankenstein monster that turned against its creator, as portrayed in Mary Shelleys novel when the monster said to Victor Frankenstein, "I should have been your Adam, but instead I am your fallen angel."
This question arises in the context of current political developments that have resulted from over six decades of distorted relations. Lets emphasize "political developments" and the voices growing louder about the unsuitability of politicians—read civilians—for reforming the security apparatus, limiting the matter of reform to technical issues.
This leads us to the question posed above, preceded by a few quick questions: Do armies arise or emerge randomly? And is the decision of a state, society, or group to form an army a political or a technical military decision?
Naturally, and without delving too deeply into human history, the decision to establish an armed force or army is fundamentally a political decision. It is driven by the necessities of protecting the state and governance and by ambitions for expansion and conquest—in contemporary terms, colonialism. More precisely, the decision to establish an armed force is primarily a political one, evolving with political developments to become governed by constitutional texts that define its roles according to the circumstances.
The formation and constitutional detailing of armies are influenced by the prevailing social system and the nature of the political regime governing a state. The armies of authoritarian single-party regimes differ from those of democratic systems. Here, it must be stressed, from my perspective, that there is no such thing as military rule. When an officer carries out a coup against a government, whatever its nature, he makes a political decision, not a military one. If successful, he becomes a political figure since he will not implement a military field plan but will present a political program, regardless of its nature, to govern the country. If he uses military and security institutions to consolidate his rule, this reflects the nature of authoritarian regimes, including dictatorships, single-party systems, and monarchies. These are all civilian regimes of a singular nature. In contrast, constitutional democratic and pluralistic regimes have clear ways of managing state institutions, including the military.
Returning to our main question, "Where did the army come from?" it is important to note that the celebration of Sudanese Armed Forces Day is tied to the appointment of the first Sudanese army leader in 1954, a year before the last British military unit left Sudanese territory and the countrys independence was achieved a few months later. Until then, it was known as the Sudan Defense Force, and it is well known that the decision to establish the Sudan Defense Force was made by the British government in 1925, which was then colonizing the country. This decision, too, was political, serving colonial objectives, with the Governor-General in Khartoum as its commander-in-chief.
After national governance prevailed, the name changed to the Sudanese Armed Forces, which became a pillar of state institutions under an unstable democratic civilian rule. This instability led to the distortion of civilian life in both political and military aspects, resulting in the complex crisis we are experiencing now.
Despite the current confusion, the formation of armies is governed by political decisions, as I have previously explained. This political decision comes with other evidence supporting civilian participation in any military reform process, making it an inherent, vital, and important part, not an intrusion. The reform process must be carried out according to a comprehensive theoretical framework that represents the states vision across its institutions before reaching the technical reform stage, which is undertaken by military specialists. This framework must include our vision of the military as an institution and what should be provided for it to perform its assigned tasks, whether legislatively or logistically.
Certainly, civilians will not understand—nor is it their concern—how armies move, nor will they stand at a sand table to determine the routes of attack or retreat. They will not decide on the technical and military needs of the army or how it should be structured to perform its tasks. These are technical matters.
It is self-evident that the military institution does not determine whether the army is established solely for national defense or as an offensive force serving expansionist goals. It is not the military institution that decides to send troops to fight in the Suez Canal during the October War or to fight within the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen. These are political decisions, even if made by a state leader with a military background. The story of President Nimeiri with Major General Mohamed Abdel Qader serves as a testimony to the boundaries between politics and the military, even when a military school graduate sits in the presidential chair in uniform. In my writings about the mercenary Rolf Steiner, I mentioned this story: The late Major General Mohamed Abdel Qader was the commander of the Southern Command during Steiners activities in the South. The army had besieged the site where he operated to assist the Anya-Nya at that time. After the military tightened the siege, they received orders from the armys General Command, signed by Commander-in-Chief Nimeiri, to halt operations, allowing Steiner to escape to Uganda. Major General Mohamed Abdel Qader was furious and took the first flight from Juba to Khartoum, meeting Nimeiri in his office. He asked him directly why the attack on Steiners position was called off when they were on the verge of capturing him. Nimeiri replied that it was a political decision unrelated to the military, prompting the major general to immediately resign.
Another example is that the decision to go to war is primarily a political decision made by the head of state, a civilian role in my view. The decision to go to war is not made by the military institution based on its desires. When the head of state decides to go to war, he does so not from his chair in the palace but based on a comprehensive vision involving various state parties, primarily the military institution, which is the first factor influencing the decision. War is not just what happens on battlefields; it is much broader. It involves, alongside military readiness, a capable Ministry of Finance to meet logistical requirements, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs for diplomatic efforts, a media apparatus capable of managing an informational battle to support the military, and above all, a united popular front to support the decision and, consequently, the military.
Another bright acknowledgment of the importance of political, civilian participation in reforming the military institution is that the constitution defines the duties and powers of that institution. Even under civilian authoritarian regimes, it is the parliament, composed of civilian members, that ratifies the constitution, unless it is approved by a general popular referendum. Parliament also passes the laws governing the military institutions internal operations, just like other institutions. Moreover, in respectable countries, it is the parliament that approves the decision to go to war, ensuring that all state institutions and authorities share responsibility for the decision.
But before all that, the army comes from the people. Its members are not mercenaries but Sudanese citizens who chose the military profession and underwent training to perform their duties in facilities owned by the people and funded by public money, just like others in various state service institutions. They are part of the broader Sudanese community, which includes doctors, engineers, workers, teachers, university professors, farmers, and herders. To serve all these people in their noble duties, they must listen to the views of the civilians on reforming their institution.
Military personnel must recognize the major deception that coup plotters often try to cover up in the name of the institution, using it for political projects and aligning it with certain groups rather than serving the nation and state. The military institution, by its nature, is not designed to rule; that is a mere claim promoted by those with political agendas within it. As mentioned, a coup leader is a politician with a political viewpoint he wishes to realize by hiding behind the military, which contradicts the nature of this institution, which is based solely on nationalism and neutrality. They must protect their institution and not allow it to become Frankensteins monster by defending the principle of professionalism and expertise, often undermined by politically affiliated members, and maintaining control and discipline over its constitutionally defined duties. They must defend and protect the democratic system to complete the countrys permanent constitution, as politicians and their supporters in the military institution have been stalling the constitution-making process since independence, making it easier to exploit this institution for political regimes rather than serving the states highest interests.
