News

Observer: How UAE’s covert a “ring of fire” around Sudan

Moatinoon
The British newspaper The Observer has published today a detailed investigation alleging that the United Arab Emirates has played a decisive, though indirect, role in shaping the trajectory of Sudan’s war — primarily by reinforcing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through logistical networks outside Sudan’s borders. According to the report, officials, analysts and Western intelligence sources believe these networks are among the most crucial factors that enabled the RSF to sustain prolonged operations and achieve battlefield gains, particularly in western Sudan and across the Darfur region.

The investigation describes a support mechanism that does not appear inside Sudan directly, but rather operates through a third country — Chad. It states that the UAE established a field hospital and logistical facilities in western Chad, close to the Sudanese border. Cargo flights reportedly arrive at Chadian airports labelled as humanitarian shipments, but intelligence officials told the newspaper that a portion of these shipments is later diverted to ground convoys that cross into Sudan, eventually supplying RSF units.

This multi-layered supply chain, the newspaper argues, forms what US Africa expert Cameron Hudson called a “ring of fire” around Sudan — a phrase referring to the new operational reality in which the RSF can draw strength from external arteries, especially in regions that were historically isolated from central Sudanese state supply lines. According to analysts cited in the article, these supply routes bolstered the RSF’s ability to expand, launch offensives, and secure control over key territory — including major urban centres in Darfur.

The UAE denies the accusations and insists that any cargo originating from its territory and bound for Sudan is strictly humanitarian. However, the article notes that Emirati officials do not provide granular detail on the exact nature of the cargo, nor on the third-party operators handling the logistics in Chad. Several of the hubs are not directly operated by UAE government bodies, further complicating accountability and oversight.

Experts interviewed by the paper argue that this pattern of indirect involvement demonstrates how the Sudan conflict has transformed into a proxy battleground within a regional power competition. They point to the UAE’s simultaneous commercial expansion in Africa — particularly in ports, logistics infrastructure and high-value mineral deals — as context for its strategic interests.

The article concludes that the war in Sudan is no longer purely domestic. Rather, it has become a node within a broader geopolitical contest playing out across the Red Sea and the Sahel. While external actors may view it through the lens of influence, corridors and access, Sudanese civilians are trapped inside the destructive outcome: prolonged warfare, mass displacement, atrocities and a humanitarian crisis that deepens with every month the conflict continues.